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Cordless Telephones and
the Fourth Amendment: A
Trap for the Unwary Consumer
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Kansas recently became the first state
high court to consider the issue of whether law enforcement
officers must obtain a warrant prior to intercepting a cordless
telephone conversation.' In State v. Howard' the court held that,
because cordless telephone conversations fall outside the protection afforded by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III), 3 no warrant is needed.

Therefore, recordings of such conversations are not subject to
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule4 and are admissible as
5
evidence at trial.

1 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has since become the second court to
decide this issue. State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985).
2 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984).

Pub. L. No. 90-351 Title III, § 8Q2, 82 Stat. 212 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-20 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Title III or by section number].
, Title III contains a statutory version of the judicially announced exclusionary
rule. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982) provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in
or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory
body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter.
The "contents" of a communication include "any information concerning the identity
of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning
of that communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (1982).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1982) (willful interception of a communication or
the disclosure or use of an intercepted communication in violation of Title III punishable
by imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine of up to $10,000); 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1982) (recovery of civil damages authorized against one who unlawfully intercepts,
discloses or uses contents of communication).
The Delauriercourt reached the same conclusion on similar facts. 488 A.2d 688.
Delaurier's neighbor reported to police that "her son had been playing with the dial on
her AM radio and had tuned in to what appeared to be a man discussing the sale of
drugs." Id. at 690. Police recorded several subsequent conversations and introduced
them as evidence at a bail-revocation hearing that resulted from Delaurier's illegal
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The Kansas court faced one of the many thorny problems
associated with the use-and abuse-of cordless phones. The
problems arise because, while the phones masquerade under the
6
term "telephone," they operate much like a radio transceiver.
The resulting communication is a hybrid whose definition fits
neatly neither that of a radio broadcast, nor that of a telephone
7
conversation.
Although the transmission of telephone conversations by
radio waves is not a new concept, the technique's widespread
availability to the average consumer is a recent development. By
one estimate, "[m]ore than 4 million cordless phones are in use
in the United States, with more being sold each week." s Many
users of these phones are not fully aware of the lack of privacy
inherent in their use. 9
Courts are divided on whether conversations transmitted partially by wire and partially by radio waves are protected under
Title III.10 Furthermore, many of the definitional sections of
Title III are ambiguous." Finally, commentators disagree as to
the proper legal treatment of cordless phone conversations and
the proper amount of protection to be afforded an unwary

public. 12
activities. Id. at 691.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the recorded conversations were
not protected under Title III. Relying on its own interpretation of Congressional intent,
the court stated, "Title III simply was not intended to prevent anyone from listening to
an AM broadcast, put on the air voluntarily, and accessible by anyone possessing an
ordinary AM radio." Id. at 694.
6 See Temmer v. FCC, 743 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pointing out that the
term
"telephone" is a misnomer).
For a good discussion of the history and technical aspects of cordless telephones,
see generally Amendment of Part 15 to Add New Provisions for Cordless Telephones,
49 Fed. Reg. 1512 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15) [hereinafter cited as
Amendments].
I Mauro, Fight Brews On Cordless Phone 'Tap' 6 NAT'L L.J., Feb. 6, 1984 at 8,
col. 4.
, See, e.g., Amendments, supra note 7, 34, at 1517.
10Compare United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (mobile telephones
protected as wire communications under Title III) with Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178
(Fla. 1981) (transmission of message to pocket pagers not protected under Title III) and
488 A.2d 688 (radio waves emitted by cordless telephones not protected by Title III).
See J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 3.02, at 65 (1977).
" Notre Dame University law professor G. Robert Blakey, draftsman of Title III,
believes that cordless phone users have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their
conversations. " 'If you talk into a cordless phone, how the hell do you think it gets to
7

the other end' except through a form of broadcasting. . .

col. 3.

."

Mauro, supra note 8, at 8,
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This Comment will examine the pertinent provisions of Title
III as they relate to cordless phones. It will then utilize the
framework of State v. Howard to survey previous cases that
have addressed the treatment afforded similar communications.
Finally, it will recommend regulatory action to inform all owners
and users about the significant threat to personal privacy that
accompanies the use of cordless telephones.

I.

TITLE

III: A

STATUTORY PROTECTION

OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

A.

History and Purpose of Title III

The law of electronic surveillance 3 in the United States today
is largely statutory, controlled in nearly every aspect by Title
III.' 4 Congress enacted Title III in 1968, shortly after the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Berger v. New York 5 and
Katz v. United States.'6 In Berger, the Court delineated the
minimum standards necessary for an eavesdropping statute to
survive fourth amendment scrutiny. 17 In Katz, the Court placed

" The terms "electronic surveillance" and "eavesdropping" will be used interchangeably in this Comment.
14For a discussion of pre-Title III law on electronic surveillance, see generally J.
CARR, supra note 11, §§ 1-2; 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(e) (1978 & Supp.
1984); E. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL (1974); NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, RAISING
AND LITIGATING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CLAIMS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1.2-.3 (1977);
M. PAULSEN, THE PROBLEMS OF ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING (1977).
" 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (declaring unconstitutional the New York statute governing
the use of eavesdropping equipment).
1- 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding inadmissible evidence obtained by a warrantless,
non-trespassory "bug" on the outside of a public telephone booth).
" The Berger court listed the following procedural and substantive safeguards as
constitutional prerequisites to the issuance of an electronic surveillance warrant:
(1)there must be probable cause to believe that a particular offense has
been or is being committed; (2) the conversations to be intercepted must
be particularly described; (3) the eavesdrop must be for a specific and
limited period of time to minimize the intrusion; (4) present probable cause
must be shown for the continuance or renewal of the eavesdrop; (5) the
eavesdropping must terminate once the evidence sought has been seized;
(6) there must be notice unless a showing of exigency based on the existence
of special facts is made; and (7) there must be a return on the warrant so
that the court may supervise and restrict the use of the seized conversations.
Fishman, The Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title Ii, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 41, 42 n.4 (1976) (compiling
from 388 U.S. at 54-60).
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electronic surveillance squarely within the purview of the fourth
amendment by ruling that such activities constitute a search.' 8
The fourth amendment "protects people, not places,"' 9 noted
the Court; therefore, conversations undertaken with a reasonable
expectation of privacy are protected no matter where they occur.

20

In both Katz and Berger, the Court seemed to advocate a
legislative solution to the regulation of electronic surveillance. 2'
Congress responded a year later by enacting Title 111,22 which
was "intended to reflect existing law." 23 The purpose of the
statute has been expressed in a variety of ways. 24 The Senate
Judiciary Committee maintained that the law was designed "to

'1 See 389 U.S. at 350-53. In Katz, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the
"trespass doctrine" articulated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Those cases held that a trespassory
intrusion was required to constitute a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. See 316 U.S. at 133-34; 277 U.S. at 457.
,9Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart explained that eavesdropping by government agents "violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth." Id. at 353. Justice Harlan coined the phrase "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in his concurring opinion, explaining that "Itihere is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' " Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
1 For a discussion of the effect of Berger and Katz on prior law, see Dash, KatzVariations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 296 (1968).
22See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982). For a discussion of the political controversy
leading up to Title III's enactment, see generally E. LAPIDUS, supra note 14, at 38-48.
For a discussion of legislative forerunners of Title III, see generally J. CARR, supra note
11, at § 2.02.
1- See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2178. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report comprises
the only legislative history of Title Ill contained in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws.
Presumably the "existing law" referred to was Justice Stewart's opinion in Katz, quoted
in part supra note 20.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3rd Cir. 1978) (Title
III has a twofold purpose: (1) to protect the privacy of oral and wire communications,
and (2) to provide on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions for the interception of such communications); In re Proceedings to Enforce Grand Jury Subpoenas,
430 F. Supp. 1071, 1072-73 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (statute deemed to be the legislative
enactment of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and its purpose is to deter the
invasion of an individual's privacy through the misconduct of officials by denying "the
fruits of their misconduct"); United States v. Carroll, 332 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (D.D.C.
1971) ("intended to deal with increasing threats to privacy resulting from the growing
use of sophisticated electronic devices and the inadequacy of limited prohibitions contained [in prior law]").
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protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect
the integrity of court and administrative proceeding and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce.''2 Congress also
intended that "all unauthorized interception of such [wire and
oral] communications should be prohibited, as well as the use
of the contents of unauthorized interceptions as evidence in
courts and administrative hearings.' '26
B.

The Scope of Title III

Title III does not prohibit all electronic surveillance performed without a court order. 27 Only surveillance that constitutes
an "interception ' 28 of the "contents ' 29 of "wire
communications" 0 or "oral communications' ' a3 by the use of
any "electronic, mechanical, or other device ' 32 is prohibited.
" S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at 2177.
z Id. For the statutory enactment of this exclusionary intent, see note 4 supra and
accompanying text.
27 Ambiguities in the language of Title III allow some surveillance to fall through
"loopholes." See J. CARR, supra note 11, at § 3.-1-.09. Additionally, some activities
are expressly excepted from statutory protection by specific provisions of Title III. See
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (telephone company employees); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)
(employees of the FCC); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (consensual interceptions); 18 U.S.C. §
2518(7) (emergency situations).
"- " '[I]ntercept' means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982).
" " '[C]ontents,' when used with respect to any wire or oral communication,
includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communication
or the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that communication." 18 U.S.C. §

2510(8).
'o

For the definition of "wire communication," see text accompanying note 55

"

For the definition of "oral communication,"

infra.
see text accompanying note 55

infra.
'2 "[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus
which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility,
or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a
communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its business
and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its
business; or (ii) being used by a communications common carrier in the
ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties;
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal
hearing to not better than normal.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1982). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has held that an AM
radio is not a "device" within the meaning of Title III: "We do not believe that
Congress intended to include within the meaning of 'device' an ordinary, unadulterated
AM radio." State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I. 1985).
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The statutory definitions3 3 of these terms are critical, because
surveillance that does not conform to the statutory language is
not regulated by Title III. 34 The proper interpretation of these
definitions is the question most often raised in Title III litiga35
tion.
The provisions of Title III apply to state as well as federal
law enforcement officers.3 6 Furthermore, state law enforcement
officers may use electronic surveillance only if the state has37
enacted legislation expressly authorizing electronic surveillance.

" Although a part of the definition of "intercept," the term "aural acquisition"
is not defined in Title III. See note 28 supra. The legislative history provides no clue as
to the term's intended meaning, except to specify that use of a pen register does not
constitute an interception. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at 2178. A pen register
is a device that, when attached to a phone line, records the number called but not the
conversation held. See J. CARR, supra note 11, at §§ 3.02[3][b][ii], 3.0312].
' See J. CARR, supra note 11, at § 3.02.
" See W. LAFAvE, supra note 14, § 2.2, at 272.
See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (making clear the power of the
federal government to prohibit bugging by state officers in violation of the fourth
amendment). Accord Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (making the fourth amendment
right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure applicable to the states).
17 S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at 2187. Kentucky has chosen not to enact
such legislation. Therefore, eavesdropping without the consent of at least one party to
the conversation is a criminal offense. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (BobbsMerrill 1985) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The practice of wiring an informant for sound
has become the chief means of eavesdropping in Kentucky because the informant has
given the requisite consent required by KRS § 526.010 (1984). That section provides:
" 'Eavesdrop' means to overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of a wire or oral
communication of others without the consent of at least one party thereto by means of
any electronic, mechanical or other device." Id. (emphasis added). KRS § 526.070 (1984)
provides for certain exceptions:
A person is not guilty under this chapter when he:
(1) Inadvertently overhears the communication through a regularly installed telephone party line or on a telephone extension but does not divulge
it; or
(2) Is an employe of a communications common carrier who, while acting
in the course of his employment, intercepts, discloses or uses a communication transmitted through the facilities of his employer for a purpose
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of the service or to the
protection of the rights of the property of the carrier of such communication, provided however that communications common carriers shall not
utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or
service quality control checks.
The proscription against non-consensual eavesdropping applies only to state officials and
state courts. Federal agents may eavesdrop in Kentucky under the authority of Title III,
but evidence is admissible only in federal, not state courts. Likewise, evidence gathered
unlawfully by state officials still may be admissible in federal courts, although the state
officials may be subject to civil sanctions. See United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369,
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Such legislation may be more, but not less, restrictive than Title
III.38 Even so, most state statutes either expressly incorporate
the language of the federal statute or employ substantially similar
language. 39 Only a few states provide greater procedural protection to the right of conversational privacy than does Title 111.40
II. A SAMPLE ANALYSIS UNDER TITLE III: State v. Howard
In State v. Howard,4' the defendants' neighbor was at home

tuning his AM/FM radio when he heard the defendants, who
were using their cordless telephone. 2 Realizing that a narcotics
deal was being discussed, he recorded both that and several
subsequent conversations and turned the information over to the
Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI). 43 The KBI supplied the
neighbor with a tape recorder and blank tapes, requested that
1372 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976). But cf.Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960) (evidence unlawfully gathered by state officials is excluded in federal
suit as violative of due process).
A total of 28 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation authorizing eavesdropping to date. For a complete compilation see C. FismAN, WIRETAPPING
AND EAVESDROPPING § 5 n.14 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
" See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (Mass. 1975); S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 23, at 2187. For a good discussion of the interaction between Title III
and state eavesdropping statutes, see J. CARR, supra note 11, at § 2.04.
1 See J.CARR, supra note 11, at § 2.04. The legislative history of Title III suggests
that Congress intended its provisions to be closely echoed by state statutes. See S. REP.
No. 1097, supra note 23, at 2187 ("The state statute must meet the minimum standards
reflected as a whole in the proposed chapter."). Accord 114 CONG. REc. 11,208, 14,470
(1968) (statements of Sen. John McClellan); 114 CoNG. Rac. 14,731 (statement of Sen.
Ralph Yarborough).
*jSee, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (1984); N.Y. CiuM. PRoc. LAW § 700.05
(McKinney 1984). These states apparently protect an oral communication regardless of
whether an expectation of privacy exists. A cordless phone conversation would therefore
seem to enjoy absolute protection against warrantless interception in these jurisdictions
notwithstanding 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
4,679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984).
12 "The radio receiver in question was a standard make and model and had not
been modified in any manner to monitor or intercept defendants' conversation." Id. at
198. The Howard court noted that defendants' cordless phone was operating on a
frequency identical to or similar to that of a commercial FM radio station. Id. at 199.
For a general discussion of recent operating frequency reassignments, see Amendments, supra note 7. See also In re Authorization of Spread Spectrum and Other
Wideband Emissions Not Presently Provided for in the FCC Rules ad Regulations, 87
F.C.C.2d 876, 881-82 (1981) (discussing the overdemand for available frequencies and
the problems resulting therefrom).
4,679 P.2d at 198.
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he record any future conversations,4 and then obtained court
45
authorization for a pen register.
When the police had ascertained that the recorded conversations coincided with the pen register numbers, they obtained
a search warrant for the defendants' home and seized a cordless
telephone and "certain narcotic drugs." ' 46 The defendants were
charged with possession of cocaine and conspiracy to sell mari47
juana.

The district court suppressed the recorded telephone conversations, holding that they were "wire communications" under
Title III and that, absent court authorization, their interception
violated the statute.48 The Supreme Court of Kansas addressed
the suppression on an interlocutory appeal. 9

A.

Wire Communication v. Oral Communication

The Howard court ultimately faced two issues: 1) whether a
cordless phone conversation is properly characterized as a "wire

- An agent of the KBI testified that "he would not have attempted to obtain a
search warrant based solely upon the first tape recordings prepared by the confidential
informant which were obtained without the police officers' knowledge or involvement."
Id. at 199. The initial recordings apparently failed to meet the probable cause requirement
of 18 U.S.C. § 2518. At this time the neighbor was still acting as a private citizen and
the recordings might have been admissible at trial even if they were found to have been
unlawfully intercepted. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484-90
(1971) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not preclude the state from using
evidence gathered from illegal search conducted by private citizen). The law is somewhat
unclear about whether Title III's statutory exclusionary rule, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, would
preclude a similar use. Compare United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 990-91 (4th Cir.
1973) (allowing the use), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975) with United States v. Phillips,
540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.) (disallowing the use), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
When subsequent conversations were recorded on KBI-fumished equipment, the
neighbor presumably became an agent of the police. Coolidge contains a discussion of
the private citizen/agent of police distinction. See 403 U.S. at 484-90.
45A pen register monitors the outgoing electronic impulses created from the dialing
of a telephone. It perforates a tape, indicating the date, time and number dialed. This
allowed the KBI to correlate the dates and times indicated by the pen register attached
to defendants' phone line with those recorded by the neighbor. 679 P.2d at 198.
46679 P.2d at 198-99.
4' Id. at 198. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-4127(a), 21-3302, 65-4127(b) (1981 &
Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as KSA] (Unlawful possession or possession with intent
to sell opiates, opium, and narcotics and the resulting conspiracy are felonies; unlawful
possession or possession with intent to sell depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogenics
and the resulting conspiracy are misdemeanors.).
1 679 P.2d at 198.
" Id. See also KSA § 22-3603 (1981) (prosecution may file interlocutory appeal
-M"
iA days of suppression order).
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communication" 50 or as an "oral communication," ' 5' and 2) if
an oral communication, whether the requisite "reasonable expectation of privacy" 5 2 is present. The initial characterization as
a wire/oral communication is crucial to reaching a proper result
under Title III because a wire communication is absolutely protected from interception absent a court order5 3 while an oral
communication is protected only if a reasonable expectation of
54
privacy exists.
Section 2510 of Title III contains the relevant definitions:
As used in this chapter(1) 'wire communication' means any communication made in
whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person engaged as a common
carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications;
(2) 'oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation;5
While the proper classification of a cordless phone conversation was a question of first impression for the Howard court,
other courts had already addressed a similar question involving
mobile telephones. 6

- See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(l) (1982).
51 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982).
12See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
1' J.CARR, supra note 11, § 3.02[1]. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). The legislative
history of Title III indicates that the definition of wire communication "is intended to
be comprehensive." See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at 2178.
.' J. CARR,supra note 11, § 3.02[2]. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). One court has
explained that "there is a reason for the more restrictive definition of oral communications. When a person talks by telephone, he can reasonably assume privacy. That
assumption may often be invalid for non-wire communications. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the participants in an oral communication to make a reasonable estimate of
the privacy afforded them by their particular circumstances." United States v. Hall, 488
F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1973).
11 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
-6For a general discussion of the two types of land mobile radio services, see
generally RAM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 992 (1976).
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The seventh circuit considered the mobile phone question as
early as 1970, in United States v. Hoffa.17 Defendant Jimmy
Hoffa placed phone calls over mobile telephone units located in
union-supplied automobies. The FBI recorded several of these
conversations by using an ordinary FM radio receiver located in
its Detroit office and used the recordings to support charges of
mail fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy. In ruling the evidence
admissible, the court noted that "[s]urely, there was no expectation of privacy as to the Hoffa calls in Detroit which were
exposed to everyone in that area who possessed an FM radio
receiver or another automobile telephone tuned in to the same
channel.'"Is
Three years later, however, the ninth circuit reached the
opposite result in United States v. Hall.59 In a controversial
decision, 60 the court held that conversations between a mobile
telephone and a regular land-line telephone constitute "wire
communications" under the provisions of Title III and were
therefore absolutely protected from interception absent a court
order. 6' The court arrived at what it conceded was an "absurd
63
result '

62

by applying its interpretation of congressional intent.

'7 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971). Hoffa did
not deal with the statutory distinction between wire communications and oral communications because Title III was enacted after Hoffa's first trial in 1966. Nonetheless, the
court's holding strongly indicates that it would not have defined the radio-telephone
conversations as wire communications even if Title III had been in effect. See id.at
1247.
" Id. at 1247.
19488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973). Hall involved facts remarkably similar to State v.
Howard with the exception that the calls were placed from mobile radio-telephones
rather than cordless phones. Defendant Hall's conversations were intercepted by a
Tucson, Arizona woman who listened to her home radio while doing housework. She
reported the suspicious conversations to the Arizona Department of Public Safety, which
asked her to continue monitoring the transmissions and to report back at regular
intervals. Subsequently, the Department conducted warrantless surveillance of defendant's conversations for five weeks, resulting in Hall's arrest on drug charges. Id. at 19495. Cf. notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
60Courts have expressly refused to follow Hall in at least three subsequent cases.
See Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1183 (Fla. 1981); State v. Howard, 679 P.2d at
204; State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688, 693 (R.I. 1985).
61 See 488 F.2d at 197. The court noted, in dictum, that a point-to-point radio
transmission would not fit the definition of a wire communication. See id. Subsequent
cases have held that such transmissions enjoy no protection under Title III. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.) (point-to-point radio transmission was not
undertaken with reasonable expectation of privacy, and was not "wire" or "oral"
communication within meaning of Title III), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
61 See 488 F.2d at 197.
63 The court observed that there is nothing in the legislative history of Title III to
indicate how Congress intended to treat a mobile telephone conversation. Id.
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The court pointed out that the language of section 2510(2)
defining oral communication is ambiguous at best and, if taken
to extremes, could result in almost every communication being
classified as a wire communication. 64 Nevertheless, it found the
statutory language "made in whole or in part... by the aid of
wire" particularly troublesome because it viewed such language
as a strict expression of Congressional intent.6 5 Therefore, despite its better judgment, it was forced to conclude that Congress
intended that any conversation involving a regular land-line telephone be protected, even though a portion of the conversation
was transmitted by radio. 66
The Supreme Court of Florida expressly rejected the holding
of Hall in Dorsey v. State.67 In Dorsey, police acting on a tip
used a "bearcat scanner ' 68 to monitor messages received by the
defendants on a "pocket pager." 69 Information obtained through
this surveillance was then used to acquire a judicial wiretap
order. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that
information received from the pager was the product of an illegal
70
interception of a wire communication.
In rejecting Hall the court noted that "[ifn Florida it is a
well-settled principle that statutes must be construed so as to
avoid absurd results. The instant statute can be so construed,

6, The

court noted that:

For example, it could be argued that if any wire is used to aid the
communication, it must be deemed a wire communication. If this were
followed to its conclusion, the use of a radio would be included in the
definition because some wires are contained in the radio transmitter and
receiver-thus the communication would be aided 'in part' by the use of
wire. However, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the
language of the immediately succeeding section which permits an agent of
the FCC, in certain circumstances, "to intercept a wire communication, or
oral communication transmitted by radio.... ." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b).
Id. at 196.
See id. at 197.
See id.
402 So. 2d 1178.
A "bearcat scanner" is a receiver capable of receiving any programmed frequency. Id. at 1182-83.
9 Id.
at 1182. A pocket pager, or "beeper," is a device capable of receiving, but
not transmitting, messages. The message is converted to radio waves at a base station
and transmitted to the beeper-and anyone else who is tuned to the beeper frequency.
Id.
"' Unlike in Howard, the trial court in Dorsey denied the motion to suppress the
intercepted messages. Id.
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and we do so to avoid reaching a result that would require a

warrant or a court order to listen to the open and available
airwaves." ' 71 The court held that the prohibition against warrantless interception applies "only to so much of the communication as is actually transmitted by wire and not broadcast in
' 72
a manner available to the public.
The Howard court also flatly rejected the holding of Hall,
stating, "In our judgment, United States v. Hall not only arrived

at an absurd result but misconstrued the Congressional intent.

'73

The court pointed out that Congressional intent is to be deter-

mined by all the relevant facts and circumstances, not by statutory language alone. 74 Following the reasoning of the Dorsey
court, and reaching the same result, the Howard court concluded

that the definition of "wire communication" encompassed only
that portion of the message that is actually transmitted by wire
and not that portion broadcast in a manner available to the
public.7 5 Therefore, the Howard court reasoned, the defendants'

7, Id. at 1183 (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that a
statute should not be interpreted as leading to an absurd result. See United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 338 (1950). The Dorsey court observed that:
Just as it would be absurd to include within the definition of 'wire communication' a message broadcast over a public address system for everyone
to hear, even though the communication is aided by certain wires, it would
be equally absurd and asinine to include within that definition television
or radio signals broadcast with no reasonable expectation of privacy and
openly available for anyone with the proper receiving equipment to hear.
402 So. 2d at 1183.
72 402 So. 2d at 1183.
7' 679 P.2d at 204. The Delauriercourt was even less charitable in its rejection of
the Hall court's reasoning:
The effect of defining defendant's broadcasts as "wire communications" would produce two results, both of which we find contrary to the
intentions of Title III. The first would be that law-enforcement authorities
would find it necessary to obtain a court order to listen to the AM
radio.... Congress clearly did not intend such a result. Second, and
perhaps more absurdly, the failure to obtain such an order could conceivably lead to liability for both civil and criminal sanctions ....
Thus, the
citizen who reported defendant's communications to the police could be
subject to criminal prosecution as well as civil lawsuits....
488 A.2d at 694 (citations omitted). See also note 4 supra.
71 See 679 P.2d at 204.
71 See id. at 205. The court underscored the irony of the contrary holding in Hall
by observing that "any citizen who listens to a mobile-telephone band does so at his
risk, and scores of mariners who listen to the ship-to-shore frequency, commonly used
to call to a land-line telephone, commit criminal acts" under the Hall rationale. Id. See
also note 4 supra.
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cordless phone conversations must be protected, if at all, under

those rules pertaining to "oral communications," rather than
'7 6

those pertaining to "wire communications.
B.

A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Rather than defining an "oral communication" as any communication that is not a "wire communication," Congress chose
to define "oral communication" in much narrower terms:
" '[O]ral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such commu-

nication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation."" "Only if a conversation fits this

definition is it protected from non-warrant interception. If the
conversants do not have a justifiable expectation of privacy,

their conversation is not an 'oral communication,' and law enforcement officials may overhear or record it without a warrant. "78
One must look to case law for the definition of a "reasonable
expectation of privacy. '

currence in

Katz80

79

The phrase itself comes from a con-

and has both a subjective and an objective

element. 8 ' Not only must the conversants have an actual expec-

See 679 P.2d at 204.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (emphasis added).
, C. FIsHmAN, supra note 37, § 22, at 37.
71 While Title III does not explain what constitutes a justifiable expectation of
privacy, its legislative history does give some indication of Congressional intent. Apparently Congress intended that the place at which a conversation occurs, while not controlling, be an important determining factor. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at
2178. Ordinarily, conversations occurring in areas generally assumed to be private-such
as one's home (Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)); office (Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)); hotel room (United States v. Burroughs, 379 F. Supp. 736
(D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 564 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1977)); or telephone booth (Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))-will support a justifiable expectation of privacy unless the
conversants speak so loudly that they should be aware of the danger of being overheard.
See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at 2178. On the other hand, "such an expectation
would clearly be unjustified" in areas such as an open field or jail. Id. In the final
analysis, all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case must be considered when
deciding whether a justifiable expectation of privacy exists. See id.
- See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
note 20 supra.
" See, e.g., Holman v. Central Ark. Broadcasting Co., 610 F.2d 542, 544-45 &
n.3 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202, 1206 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 984 (1974).
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tancy, but it must be one society recognizes as reasonable 2 The
Howard court, therefore, faced the question of whether a person
talking on a cordless phone actually expects conversational privacy and, if so, whether society recognizes that expectancy.
Every court considering the question has found that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists when conversations are
broadcast in a manner allowing interception by anyone with a
radio receiver."' In United States v. Rose 4 the First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that defendants who discussed a drug drop via
point-to-point radio had neither a subjective nor an objective
expectation of privacy. 85 The court noted that defendants' frequent switching of channels indicated a suspicion that they were
being monitored. 86 Furthermore, the fact that their conversation
could be monitored by anyone with an ordinary "ham" radio
receiver frustrated any claim that an expectation of privacy was
8
objectively reasonable. 1

The Florida court arrived at the same conclusion in Dorsey
v. State.88 Emphasizing the "broadcast nature" 89 of the messages, the court held that no expectation of privacy could exist

82 For a discussion of the value judgments that society must make in determining
whether an expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable, see W. LAFAVE, supra note
14, § 2.2, at 279-80.
81 See e.g., United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 196-97. The court recognized that
no expectation of privacy reasonably exists, but felt constrained by Congressional intent
to classify certain radio transmissions as protected wire communications under Title III.
See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
669 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
81 See id. at 24-25.
6 Id. at 25-26. It is interesting that the fourth circuit has held that while actual
ltnowledge of eavesdropping may render an expectation of privacy unreasonable, a mere
suspicion of eavesdropping will not. See United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 850
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979). Bank president Duncan was charged with
eavesdropping on IRS and FBI agents who were auditing his bank. Duncan argued that
a history of bad relations between the government and the bank should have put the
agents on notice that their conversations were being monitored. The court held that
public policy prevented its negating the agents' justifiable expectation of privacy because
of a mere suspicion of eavesdropping. See id. at 852.
17 669 F.2d at 26. See also United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281, 286 (9th Cir.
1955) (dictum), aff'd, 351 U.S. 916 (1956).
11402 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1981).
8
We emphasize the broadcastnature of such messages, since one who sends
beeper messages should know, and in the instant case the Bailey organization did in fact know, that such communications are open to any members of the public who wish to take the simple step of listening to them.
Id. at 1183-84 (emphasis in original).
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in messages being transmitted from a base station to a pocket
9
pager. 90 Even the otherwise anamolous United States v. HalP
opinion acknowledged that no expectaion of privacy reasonably
92
exists in radio transmissions.
The Howard court, then, relied on ample precedent in deciding that defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
their cordless phone conversations. 9 Furthermore, the court correctly interpreted the statute in ruling that the absence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy removed the conversations
from the statutory definition of an "oral communication" and
thereby removed the protections afforded by Title III. 94 Even
though Howard appears correct on precedential, interpretative,
and logical grounds, its ramifications are somehow troublesome-particularly its potential impact on the unwary consumer.
Perhaps regulatory, rather than judicial, action would provide a
better remedy.
III.

RECOMMO&ENDED REGULATORY ACTION To

BETTER PROTECT THE UNWARY CONSUMER

In each case discussed previously, the defendants either knew
or had reason to know95 that their conversations were susceptible

'- The court noted: "We do not reach any hypothetical questions involving more
sophisticated methods of intercepting communications which in fact engender a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as land-line telephone messages transmitted in part by
wireless signals." Id. at 1184 n.4.
,1488 F.2d 193.
" See note 83 supra.
9'See State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197, 201-04 (Kan- 1984). The court emphasized,
"this case does not involve the rights of a person on the other end of the telephone
land line who was speaking over a standard telephone and who was without knowledge
that the defendants were the owners and users of a cordless telephone." Id. at 206. The
Delauriercourt also expressly excluded this issue, but noted that such persons "may
well have been justified in expecting privacy." State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d at 694 n.4.
Unfortunately, this intriguing issue is outside the scope of this Comment.
- Aside from Title III, the interception in Howardmight qualify as an interception
of a radio communication, which is barred by 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1982). Law enforcement
officials are exempt from the provisions of § 605. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 23, at
2197. Therefore, the KBI would have needed no warrant to intercept defendants' conversations. This issue was not before the Howard court because the parties stipulated
that Title III was controlling. See 679 P.2d at 200.
"I But see United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1979), which is discussed
supra note 86. (A mere suspicion of eavesdropping may not be enough to mitigate a
justifiable expectation of privacy.).
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to interception. In Hoffa, Dorsey and Hall, defendants were
obviously using radio transmitters to communicate with someone
at a distant site. While the Howard defendants used a somewhat
different device, the court stressed that the defendants were
"fully advised by the owner's manual as to the nature of the
equipment.' '96 In concluding that the defendants were "fully
advised," the court made a crucial, and suspect, assumption:
that upon reading the words "antenna," "mobile unit" and
"base unit," and upon being advised that the cordless phone
has a range of fifty feet, 97 a consumer will naturally realize that
conversations are being broadcast to the general public. 93 Such
an assumption is contrary to reality.
Average consumers are not authorities on radio signals, bands,
and frequencies. They likely do not realize that their cordless
phones operate on a band just above that of their AM radios,
thereby making their conversations accessible to anyone with an
AM/FM receiver. 99 More likely they think of the radio signal
transmitted by a handset as traveling across the room to a base
unit, not passing through the walls of their homes and into
neighbors' homes, or into passing vehicles.' l° In short, absent a
clear warning, the average consumer probably is not "fully
0
advised . . .as to the nature of the equipment."' '1
The most feasible solution to this problem is a mandatory
consumer education program, administered by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).'02 Such a program could be
implemented by amending 47 C.F.R. part 15103 to require uniform warning labels on both the base unit and the handset.104

9 State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197, 206 (Kan. 1984).
w Many contemporary cordless phones advertise a range of 1,000 feet.
See 679 P.2d at 199.
See id. (discussing the technical aspects of defendants' cordless phone). See
generally Amendments, supra note 7 (discussing the general specifications of cordless
telephones).
100See authorities cited supra note 99.
'01
679 P.2d at 206.
,02
Some consumers have suggested that the FCC require features such as voice
scrambling or warning beepers to protect against invasion of privacy. The FCC has
rejected these suggested features as being too costly a requirement, although it acknowledges that they soon may be available as optional features on higher priced models. See
Amendments, supra note 7, at 1517.
,03
See 47 C.F.R. pt. 15 (1980).
04 Current FCC regulations require a warning label only on the base unit. 47
C.F.R. § 15.236 (1984). For a discussion of why this is so, see notes 109-10 infra and
accompanying text.

1984-1985]

CORDLESS TELEPHONES

Similar warnings should appear on the outside package 05 and it
the owner's manual.1t0 The warning should plainly state that E
danger of unauthorized interception exists. 07
Despite numerous complaints from consumers concerning the
insufficiency of current labeling requirements, 0 8 the FCC has
acquiesced to industry requests that labeling requirements be
kept to a minimum.' °9 Industry representatives complain that
warning labels consume too much space and are "aesthetically
unpleasing."' ' 0 In light of the Howard decision, such concerns,
on balance, seem to have little merit.
CONCLUSION

The explosive domestic market for cordless telephones has
caused a myriad of concerns-intertwining technological and
legal issues. One such issue is the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches. While courts agree that no
expectation of privacy reasonably exists in radio broadcasts, the
underlying premise of the rule-actual or constructive knowledge
of possible interception-becomes questionable when applied to
a relatively new technology such as cordless phones. Arguably
most consumers do not understand the danger these devices pose
to conversational privacy.
The most feasible solution seems to be the amendment of
FCC regulations to require a mandatory program of consumer
education through the increased use of warning labels. Such a
program would increase consumer awareness dramatically, at

" A warning on the outside of the package would ensure that a consumer is fully
informed of the danger to privacy before investing in a cordless phone.
'°6Several manufacturers have urged the FCC to require warnings only in the
owner's manual. See Amendments, supra note 7, at 1517-18.
,07
The current warning label required by 47 C.F.R. § 15.236 (1984) contains one
sentence concerning the danger to privacy, and that sentence is not particularly forceful:
"Privacy of Communications may not be ensured when using this phone."
114See Amendments, supra note 7, at 1517 & n.19 (citing a complaint received
from Mr. Samuel H. Beverage that consumers may not be aware that a cordless telephone
is a radio device and that conversations may not be private, and acknowledging that the
FCC has received numerous complaints of a similar nature).
'1 See id. at 1517-18. The FCC had originally proposed to require a warning label
on both the handset and the base unit. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed.
Reg. 16,298 (1983). But after manufacturers complained, the FCC decided to require a
warning label on the base unit only. See Amendments, supra note 7, at 1517-18.
11 See Amendments, supra note 7, at 1517.

1184

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 73

little or no cost to the manufacturer, and increased costs could
be passed through to the consumer-the ultimate beneficiary.
Best of all, the program would, without offending a basic sense
of fairness, allow the courts to impute knowledge to the user of
a cordless telephone.
Mark S. Snell

